Six of them, in detail. Your sector is almost certainly in the other six hundred and thirty-four.
Six drawn from the book, one apiece from six different industries, chosen because the
shape of each problem shows up everywhere. In each we named the number we expected to move before we
started, then reported against that same list. Every one was run by a named CFO with specialists
alongside them — which is the difference between this and a fractional CFO on their own.
01 · CONSTRUCTION & TRADESQ1 2024 – Q2 2025 · 18 MONTHS
Profitable on paper, and the surety had held the bonding limit flat for two years.
Three more projects running at once, and a business a buyer could price.
Bonding capacity went to 2.4 times where it started, so the company could carry three more concurrent contracts with the same crews and plant. Eighteen months later the owner took an offer, and the WIP schedule the surety had learned to trust was the same one that survived the buyer’s diligence without a discount.
WHO WAS ACTUALLY ON ITYour CFO, with the costing bench and a construction finance specialist who had prepared schedules for surety review.
WHAT WE FOUNDWork in progress was a percentage-complete estimate nobody had challenged, carried forward month after month. Retention was sitting unclaimed across eleven closed contracts. The schedule going to the surety did not reconcile to the management accounts.
WHAT WE DIDWe rebuilt costing at job level on a cost-to-cost basis, made the winning estimate the monthly benchmark, put every variation on a priced register, and gave the surety a WIP schedule on a fixed rhythm with the same numbers as the board pack.
THE MEASUREON ARRIVALLATERMOVEMENT
Profit on finished jobs, against what was bid4.6% below→5.2% above+9.8 pts
Money held back by customers, still unpaid8 months→under 1 month89% collected
Extra work priced before it got done18% of it→all of itevery job
How much work the bonding company would back1x→2.4x3 more projects
Revenue band C · 140 staff · Family owned, second generation
02 · DISTRIBUTION & WHOLESALEQ2 2024 – Q1 2025 · 12 MONTHS
Profitable for three consecutive years, and drawing on the operating line every month.
Cash equal to eleven percent of a year’s revenue, taken out of stock and receivables.
The operating line was repaid and then cancelled. The next distribution center was funded from working capital instead of debt, which is a conversation the owner had assumed was three years away.
WHO WAS ACTUALLY ON ITYour CFO, with the inventory and costing analysts. The reorder-point engine was built by the group’s engineering arm in week six rather than bought in — inside the same fee.
WHAT WE FOUNDCash was in two places and both were measurable. Stock had stopped moving on a long tail of lines that were still being reordered against settings from three years earlier. Landed cost excluded duty and freight, so the margin on imported lines was whatever the system said it was.
WHAT WE DIDWe decomposed the cash conversion cycle, aged stock by SKU against real turns, recalculated reorder points on actual demand, rebuilt landed cost to the item and repriced the lines that had been sold on a cost that excluded duty and freight, and produced customer profitability with cost-to-serve allocated on orders, deliveries and returns.
THE MEASUREON ARRIVALLATERMOVEMENT
Cash tied up in stock and unpaid invoices96 days→29 days67 days freed
How long stock sat before it sold118 days→41 days77 days faster
The overdraftused every month→repaid and closedgone
Profit on imported goods, once real costs were counted21%→36%+15 pts
Revenue band B · 60 staff · Owner managed, single shareholder
03 · MANUFACTURINGQ4 2023 – Q1 2025 · 15 MONTHS
Every variance was explained away rather than investigated, and capital kept getting approved on payback.
The same plant, producing thirty-one percent more of what actually earns, with no new capital.
Once contribution per constrained hour governed the mix, the constraint stopped running low-margin work. No new machine, no new shift, no capital request — the growth came out of what the factory already had.
WHO WAS ACTUALLY ON ITYour CFO, with the costing and operations analysts and a capital appraisal specialist.
WHAT WE FOUNDThe standard cost had been set when the plant ran a different mix, so absorption was spread over a volume the factory no longer produced. The constraint governing output was not the thing the reporting was built around, so the business was optimizing everything except the machine that decided the month.
WHAT WE DIDStandards rebuilt against current routings and rates. Variances split into usage, rate, mix and volume. Contribution reported per constrained hour, and product mix, pricing and capital all judged against it. Capital cases rebuilt on realistic ramp with maintenance capital separated from growth.
THE MEASUREON ARRIVALLATERMOVEMENT
Time to close the books each month14 working days→3 working days11 days back
How much of the gap to plan we could explaina third of it→almost all of it3x
Profit per hour on the machine that limits outputnobody knew it→74% higher+74%
Equipment bought on a case that got checked afterwardsnone of it→all of itall of it
Revenue band C · 210 staff · Private equity held, first hold period
04 · PROFESSIONAL SERVICESQ3 2023 – Q3 2024 · 12 MONTHS
Everyone was busy, utilization looked healthy, and the firm was not making money.
The same people, a third more billed value, and partner distributions that finally reflected it.
Twenty-three points of realization on an unchanged headcount is the difference between a firm that works hard and one that gets paid for it. Lock-up dropped by eighty-three days, so the money arrived as well as being earned.
WHO WAS ACTUALLY ON ITYour CFO, with the practice economics specialists.
WHAT WE FOUNDUtilization only measured whether time was recorded. Realization was eroding quietly through write-offs at billing and scope that had grown without a change order. Lock-up was climbing because nobody billed promptly and nobody chased.
WHAT WE DIDWe separated utilization from realization and reported both by client, by matter and by team so write-offs concentrated visibly. Scope discipline was made mechanical and reviewed monthly. Lock-up was tracked as one number with billing and collection run as a process.
THE MEASUREON ARRIVALLATERMOVEMENT
Of every hour worked, how much got billed and paid71%→94%+23 pts
Time between doing the work and getting paid121 days→38 days83 days faster
Work finished but still unbilled after three months29% of it→1%almost none
Jobs that grew past the quote without being repriceda third of them→1 in 5094% fewer
Revenue band B · 85 staff · Partnership, nine equity partners
05 · MULTI-UNIT HOSPITALITYQ4 2023 – Q1 2025 · 15 MONTHS
The group number was fine, so the group number was the only one anybody looked at.
An estate that went from marginal to fundable, and four new sites on the back of it.
With every site above group contribution and the numbers standing up site by site, the lender moved from a single-site facility to an estate facility. Four openings followed inside a year, each one modelled on the ramp the last one actually delivered.
WHO WAS ACTUALLY ON ITYour CFO, with multi-site operators and a lease specialist, and XL Shield re-testing the estate cover against what the sites were actually exposed to.
WHAT WE FOUNDTwo sites were carrying the estate and two were draining it, and the average concealed both. Labor was reviewed as a percentage after the fact rather than scheduled against forecast demand. Two lease break dates had passed unnoticed in the previous eighteen months.
WHAT WE DIDEvery site onto a four-wall P&L on the same basis with central cost shown separately, ranked monthly with the bottom two discussed by name. Labor scheduled against forecast covers. Lease economics put on a calendar with break and renewal windows dated, and two underperforming sites renegotiated at renewal.
THE MEASUREON ARRIVALLATERMOVEMENT
Sites losing money once their own costs were counted5 of 11→noneall fixed
Gap between the best site and the worst14 points→3 points76% narrower
How far staffing missed the plan each week6 points out→under 1 point90% tighter
Profit the whole estate makesbaseline→+11 points+11 pts
Revenue band C · 11 sites · Founder led, outside minority investor
06 · TECHNOLOGY, RECURRING REVENUEQ1 2024 – Q2 2025 · 14 MONTHS
Growth was being bought and nobody had checked the price. A raise was eighteen months out.
A raise that closed, at a valuation the cohort data supported.
Net revenue retention at 141% with the cohorts to prove it, sixteen months of visibility ahead of the decision date, and nothing in the revenue policy for a diligence team to reopen. The round was raised from a position rather than a deadline.
WHO WAS ACTUALLY ON ITYour CFO, with the revenue recognition specialists, and invest-EDGE alongside from month five on the raise — the people who talk to capital sitting in the same firm as the people preparing the numbers.
WHAT WE FOUNDAcquisition cost was calculated on marketing spend alone, so the real payback was nineteen months rather than the eleven the board believed, and the cohort curves that would have shown it had never been built. Revenue recognition on multi-year contracts and set-up fees would not have survived a diligence review.
WHAT WE DIDCohorts built by signing period so retention became a measured figure, then the two segments dragging it down were repriced and one was retired. Acquisition cost loaded with the sales cost that earns it, and spend moved off the two channels that were paying back past twenty months. Revenue policy fixed and documented before anybody else tested it. Runway modeled on committed cost with the decision date named nine months ahead of the cash-out date.
THE MEASUREON ARRIVALLATERMOVEMENT
What last year’s customers spend this year104% of before→141% of before+41% spend
Months to earn back the cost of winning a customer19 months→7 months12 mo sooner
Revenue booked in a way an auditor would reopen31% of contracts→none of itall cleaned
Warning before the money runs outnone→16 months16 mo notice
Revenue band A · 45 staff · Venture backed, Series B